[This message has been edited by Pitt (edited 04-15-2013 @ 11:26 AM).]
True, but this would still leave him with a substantial force of 34,000 who could be brought back to fighting conditioning after a few days rest. I also agree about the difficulty of riding to Rome from the distant field of Cannae.Quoted from Pitt:
Also, the figures listed above are fatalities, not all casualties (Polybius, III.117). The traditional rule of thumb is to assume about two wounded for every one fatal casualty. Out of a total of about 50,000 (10,000 cavalry, slightly over 40,000 infantry: III.114; Lazenby accepts Polybius' figures, though has some reservations as to the Roman numbers), with 5,700 killed, and, say, another 10,000 wounded, Hannibal's army would have been seriously weakened. Even reducing the wounded-killed ratio to 1:1 would still represent a serious reduction in fighting power.
I have to disagree with Lazenby on this. While Rome certainly could've raised fresh forces in the form of an emergency conscription and slave soldiers, these men would only have several weeks training at most be and completely untested in battle. The Macedonian Wars, Seleucid War, and the civil war between Caesar and Pompey all highlight the significant advantage that experienced and hardened troops have over freshly trained or quickly raised soldiers. Numbers can only give so much of a psychological advantage, and it isn't beyond reason that thousands of unseasoned slaves and Roman citizens would break quickly after witnessing Hannibal's Gauls, Iberians and Libyans cut down hundreds of their comrades in the front ranks.Quoted from Pitt:
Secondly, despite the rhetorical exaggerations of Livy (e.g. 22.54.9), Rome still had some troops left already under arms, to say nothing of thousands she could raise from her own citizens and those of her allies, given time. Even for the immediate defence of the city, the two city legions, raised at the beginning of the year (Livy 23.14.2), would have been available, as well as the 1500 men[Marcus Claudius] Marcellus had at Ostia and the legion of marines he [later] sent to Teanum Sidicinum (Livy 22.57.7-8). Men who lived in the city could very rapidly have been armed and organized into some sort of temporary home-guard, and a very considerable force was in fact raised from the slave population (Livy 22.57.11).
I agree that Hannibal was lacking when it came to siegecraft, but Lazenby makes a logical but flawed assumption regarding the survivors of Cannae. These men had barely survived one of the most one-sided battles of all-time, and witnessed tens of thousands of their countrymen being slaughtered like cornered cattle. I seriously doubt that they'd be in any hurry to face a Carthaginian army, let alone the same one that massacred their greatest army. Also, while the legions in Sardinia, Sicily and Spain could've certainly returned, the time of arrival would've varied considerably especially for the forces in Spain. I seriously doubt a general of Hannibal's caliber would've allowed his enemy to unite in a single massive force again, so it isn't unreasonable to assume that he would confront the returning legions as they arrived and gradually wiped out Rome's pool of reliable soldiers.Quoted from Pitt:
But if he had settled down to besiege the city, it is even less likely that he would ever have taken it. He had, for example, spent eight months on the siege of Saguntum, and if the Romans had been able to hold him off for anything like that length of time, they would have been able to raise overwhelming relief forces: the survivors of Cannae constituted a force of more than two legions in themselves. Postumius and his two legions could have been recalled from Cisalpine Gaul, and, with the aid of continuing superiority at sea, the legions from Sardinia and Sicily, to say nothing of those in Spain, could have been brought home. Thus Hannibal's besieging army would soon have found itself faced by forces at least as large as those he had fought at Cannae, and would have been in increasing danger of being hemmed in, just the kind of warfare he was always anxious to avoid.
I disagree with Lazenby's assessment. I believe the besieging of the Republic's capital would've had an equal, if not greater, psychological effect on southern Italy if not central Italy as well. People are naturally inclined to be carried away by the heat of the moment and to follow someone who is both successful and audacious. It isn't unrealistic to believe that Hannibal could've induced more Italian cities to declare for him if he'd followed up on his victory at Cannae with an immediate march on the Roman capital. The Roman Republic would be at its greatest moment of weakness, with conquest or annihilation being a very real possibility. Historical events proved that the people of southern Italy were eager to throw off the Roman yoke if given the opportunity and a bold maneuver aimed at the heart of the Republic might've been enough to dispel the fears of those cities closest to Rome (and thus closer to immediate reprisal) and induce them to rebel as well.Quoted from Pitt:
If Hannibal had marched on the city after Cannae, moreover, this would have involved a complete reversal of his long-term strategy ...[T]he destruction of the city probably formed no part of his plans... What Hannibal hoped to achieve was to win over Rome's Latin and Italian allies, and he would have risked throwing away the psychological effect of his great victory, which was soon to lead to the defection of much of southern Italy, if he marched away from the areas where he might hope to gain support, into the heart-land of the Roman confederacy, largely populated by Roman citizens and by loyal allies. It is significant that the only time he ever did march on the city, in 211, it was for the purely strategic purpose of drawing the Roman armies away from Capua, his most important ally in Italy.
The fact that he never considered this war to be one fought to the death is why I believe Hannibal's original strategy was flawed. If his goal had been to destroy Rome itself instead of converting its allies, I believe he could've won or at least guaranteed Carthage's survival. His allies in southern Italy proved themselves to be more of a burden than a boon as he was forced to rush back and forth to defend them whenever they were threatened by Rome's legions, while they barely provided replacement troops for his army. However, if he didn't protect them he risked looking weak to both them and the Romans which could've had disastrous consequences for him and his men (acts of betrayal, no secure bases for his army, being forced to live off the land due to lack of proper food & supplies, etc.).Quoted from Pitt:
Thus, for Hannibal, Cannae must have seemed not so much the end of the war, to be followed by a triumphant march on the enemy's capital, as the beginning of the end, and the justification for his adherence to his original strategy[i.e. detaching Rome's allies from her allegiance] was precisely that so much of southern Italy did now begin to come over to him. Looking back on it, with the benefit of hind-sight, we can see that Cannae was the high point of his campaign, and that after it the tide began slowly to turn against him, but the years that followed were to be years of continued success, and the real turning-point only came in 212-211.
All too true, but I'd still like to believe that the war could've gone differently if Hannibal had changed his strategy by targeting Rome's cities and infrastructure instead of only destroying its armies. It would've been difficult as sieges weren't his strong suite, but I think Hannibal would've eventually overcome that weakness with the same vigor and energy he showed in his crossing of the Alps.Quoted from Pitt:
Hannibal's non-march on Rome bears similarities to many other incidents where we think generals should have done something different, if only because we know that they ultimately lost the war. The stop before Dunkirk is one example, as is the halting of the Jacobite march on London during the 1745 Rebellion.
What might seem like a too dangerous risk to a commander at the time can seem like a sensible gamble to us because, since they lost anyway, we can observe that they might as well have taken the chance.
You can't say his strategy is flawed if you look at it from his point of view. Rome was the first state to really fight to the death in war, there was no precedent in that area. Even the First Punic War neither side fought to the death, just until they couldn't fight anymore economically. So from Hannibal's point of view, it wasn't a war to the death, merely a war to weaken each other to irrelevance.Quoted from DU:
The fact that he never considered this war to be one fought to the death is why I believe Hannibal's original strategy was flawed.
True, but wouldn't the most effective way to weaken an enemy be to target their bases and infrastructure rather than their allies? I'm probably thinking a bit too much in modern terms, but if Hannibal's intended goal was to weaken the Roman Republic to the point of military impotence then wouldn't the most effective way to do that be to specifically target the Romans themselves rather than their allies? If he slowly deprived the Roman army of its bases and pool of manpower and potential reinforcements, then it would only be a matter of time before he ground the Roman war machine down and neutralized the Republic's ability to make war on Carthage or anyone else.Quoted from Punic:
You can't say his strategy is flawed if you look at it from his point of view. Rome was the first state to really fight to the death in war, there was no precedent in that area. Even the First Punic War neither side fought to the death, just until they couldn't fight anymore economically. So from Hannibal's point of view, it wasn't a war to the death, merely a war to weaken each other to irrelevance.
Well, the battle of Beneventum stands against your argument.Quoted from DU:
Numbers can only give so much of a psychological advantage, and it isn't beyond reason that thousands of unseasoned slaves and Roman reason that thousands of unseasoned slaves and Roman citizens would break quickly.
And after the first couple of weeks they would abandon him. Hannibal had an issue with sieges; Saguntum, three times at Nola etc.Quoted from DU:
It isn't unrealistic to believe that Hannibal could've jnduced more Italian cities to declare for him if he'd followed up induced more Italian cities to declare for him if he'd followed up on his victory at Cannae with an immediate march on the Roman capital.
You misunderstand my intent (which is likely my fault). I didn't mean that Hannibal should try and convince the Romans living in Arretium, Ariminium and other cities to side with him. I meant that he should target and destroy/enslave them similar to what he did at Saguntum. Doing so would've eaten away at the Roman Republic's manpower, whilst also intimidating her allies into either staying neutral or willingly joining the Carthaginian invader.Quoted from Punic:
Prying the Roman allies away from Rome would be easier than getting the Romans that didn't live in Rome to abandon Rome.
I'm aware that a Roman legion was always accompanied by one made up of its allies (I actually make my Roman armies half Roman and half Campanian, Ligurian, Estruscan, etc. in EBQuoted from Punic:
A legion had Ala with them, which accounted for half the strength of the final legion, (please please please tell me I'm not screwing this up), if we were to think of the war in terms of what part of the legion Hannibal targeted, he wanted to kill half (the Romans), and make the other half go away (the Ala).
The army that fought against Pyrrhus at Beneventum was vastly superior to the army of quickly trained slaves and conscripts that would be presented in the alternate scenario that's been described in the past few posts.Quoted from Alex:
Well, the battle of Beneventum stands against your argument.
As long as he defeated any relief attempts and prevented the Romans from marching on their own cities, I don't see any reason for Hannibal's Italian allies to abandon him. It took years for the Romans to grind down the loyalty of Hannibal's allies in southern Italy, and I believe many of them abandoned him only after the Romans had stormed their capital cities (unless I'm greatly mistaken).Quoted from Alex:
And after the first couple of weeks they would abandon him. Hannibal had an issue with sieges; Saguntum, three times at Nola etc.
Not a problem Pitt, and it's quite enjoyable to have a good old fashioned historical debate with you and Punic. Reminds me of the old days when the forums were buzzing with activity.Quoted from Pitt:
I don't have time right now to respond to everything, so this will necessarily be brief and rather citation free.
I'd forgotten about his siege of Naples. I wonder if it might've been enough to convince the Carthaginian senate reinforcements to Italy if he'd succeeded? Having a major city to house new troops and a secure harbor for the Carthaginian fleet to dock at could've given his brother Mago enough clout to sway more senators to his cause during his post-Cannae meeting with the senate.Quoted from Pitt:
Hannibal's first major target after Cannae was Naples. This was a sensible choice, when you consider it was only about 550 km from Carthage itself, and had a good harbour. Had he taken it, he would have gained a good base that could have received Carthaginian fleets carrying reinforcements (assuming they avoided the Roman fleet, of course). He did not succeed in taking it, and shortly after acapua defected from Rome.
Adding the 15,000 survivors of Cannae under Marcellus plus an equal number of allied legions to Pera's would give a total of 65,000 troops. A much more daunting number than I originally believed. Going from that, it would seem that Hannibal's best chance of securing victory would've been to defeat Marcellus' troops before he could unite with Pera's, but Marcellus showed himself to be a shrewd commander by refusing pitched battle and instead frustrated Hannibal with a series of sorties, skirmishes and raids.Quoted from Pitt:
At about the same time, the dictator Junius Pera had successfully gathered an army of 25,000 men, and moved towards Campania. Two of his legions were the ones stationed at Rome, raised the year before. He also received a good-sized contingent of allies.
[This message has been edited by DominicusUltimus (edited 04-15-2013 @ 09:52 PM).]
Hannibal's officers all surrounded him and congratulated him on his victory, and urged that after such a magnificent success he should allow himself and his exhausted men to rest for the remainder of the day and the following night. Maharbal, however, the commandant of the cavalry, thought that they ought not to lose a moment. "That you may know," he said to Hannibal, "what has been gained by this battle I prophesy that in five days you will be feasting as victor in the Capitol. Follow me; I will go in advance with the cavalry; they will know that you are come before they know that you are coming." To Hannibal the victory seemed too great and too joyous for him to realise all at once. He told Maharbal that he commended his zeal, but he needed time to think out his plans. Maharbal replied: "The gods have not given all their gifts to one man. You know how to win victory, Hannibal, you do not how to use it." That day's delay is believed to have saved the City and the empire.Although most of this is suspect( especially the part about Maharbal), it does mention that his troops needed at least a day and a half of rest at the end of the battle.
[This message has been edited by Awesome Eagle (edited 04-15-2013 @ 11:37 PM).]
No worries and it certainly makes a lot more sense now that it's been cleared up. I was a bit perplexed as to why you would bring up a battle that had occurred roughly 50 years beforehandQuoted from Alex:
I was refering to the battle of Baneventum in 214 BC between Gracchus and Hanno, not the battle of the Pyrrhic war. I'm sorry for not being clear enough...
Wonderful link AE, but my knowledge of Carthage's naval movements during the Second Punic War is nowhere near adequate enough to answer your first question. I leave it to Pitt and Punic to enlighten both of us in that regardQuoted from AE:
Although most of this is suspect( especially the part about Maharbal), it does mention that his troops needed at least a day and a half of rest at the end of the battle.
What was the naval situation at this time? it often takes a back seat to Hannibal's campaigns, so i am unsure of the specifics.
Anyway, Even though Hannibal didn't besiege Rome when it seemed like he had the chance, how large of an army would he had needed to take the city, either in an assault or by siege (not including the number of men needed to keep the other Roman legions from breaking in? Might it have been possible if Hannibal had the manpower to Beige Rome, that we could have seen something like Alesia 150 years before it occured?
I don't remember it exactly, but there's a rule regarding siege assaults that the attacked must outnumber the defenders by at least 3-to-1 if they are to overwhelm the defenses and achieve victory. It wouldn't be complete out of the question for Hannibal to construct a siege wall large enough to encompass the entire city, but then again Hannibal isn't remembered for his skill in siege work since he preferred to take cities either by treachery or assault. Bear in mind that I may be wrong with regards to that last sentence since I'm basing it off what I've read of his Siege of Saguntum and his efforts at Nola and Tarentum.The numerical superiority is known to me, but the garrison of Rome isn't, as well as a proper appraisal of the extent to which the city was defended. Hannibal, i believe was mostly always in a rush, and needed to take cities quickly. The case with Saguntum is that When he besieged it, war was effectively declared upon Rome, and he needed to be quick in order to get past Saguntum, and into the alps/ Gaul so he could take the Romans by surprise with speed, which is exaclt what he did.
[This message has been edited by Awesome Eagle (edited 04-16-2013 @ 00:28 AM).]
[This message has been edited by Pitt (edited 04-16-2013 @ 09:59 AM).]
I see, but this would still give the combined forces in the immediate area surrounding Rome an army of roughly 41,500. A much more credible threat than I originally believed as I thought there were only two inexperienced city legions in Rome following Cannae.Quoted from Pitt:
A note: Junius Pera's entire army, allies included, was 25,000 men when it moved into Campania. I probably expressed myself too hurriedly in my earlier post. That force initially appears to have been enough to deter Hannibal from attempting a siege on towns when Junius Pera was in the vicinity.
At the time of Cannae itself, that is, before any new forces were raised, there were three legions at Rome or Ostia, as well as at least another 1,500 marines with the fleet at Ostia. That should have been enough to defend the city, though not to conduct operations in the field unsupported by further reinforcements.
I tend to apply a bit of salt when regarding Livy given his tendency to exaggerate Roman victories and embellish the number of enemy casualties, especially with his account of the Seleucid War. Nevertheless, I believe his numbers regarding the troops at Rome's disposal post-Cannae can be trusted (with the exception of his miscount of the new legions).Quoted from Pitt:
Livy says Junius Pera called up four new city legions and 1,000 cavalry, and called for men from the Latins and other allies (22.57); Lazenby believes only two new legions were raised at this time, based on a textual analysis which seems sound (Livy, when describing the allocation of legions at the beginning of 215 BC, refers only to the two old city legions and two new city legions, not four new ones).
But before they could be raised, the urgent need to send a force to Campania prompted the dictator to recruit 8,000 volunteers from the slaves in the city (22.57), as well as 6,000 debtors and criminals (23.14). He also received allies from Picenum and Cisalpine Gaul, and marched from Rome with a force of 25,000 men (23.14).
These figures seem odd; 14,000 slaves, debtors and criminals, plus the two city legions, is not far short of 25,000. There can't have been many allies in that force; presumably most had not yet arrived.
After the consular elections in March 215 BC, Livy described the forces available in Italy (23.32):
Agreed in that the southern Italians were far more of a liability to his campaign than they were worth, and given all the information that you've presented along with what I've learned from rereading Dodge's book it appears that Hannibal made the right call in not marching on Rome despite the pleas of his closest officers.Quoted from Pitt:
For Hannibal, being stuck besieging Rome with large armies assembling behind him would have been a very dangerous proposition. The mere act of marching on Rome might have caused the defection of many of the southern Italian allies, but it's unlikely it would have broken the bonds with the Latins.
The southern Italians were largely millstones around Hannibal's neck; their defection while Rome was besieged wouldn't have added much to his military power, and while he was near Rome he would have been unable to protect them from Roman retribution. The southern Italian cities also seem to have been motivated to defect as much by the immediate presence of Hannibal's army as they were by ill-feeling or antagonism towards Rome.
Given the above information, it would appear that hesitation and bad luck were as responsible for Carthaginian defeats as Roman determination. The hesitation of the Carthaginian fleet to close with the Roman fleet can be explained by defeats in the last war, but the Roman ships would not be equipped with theQuoted from Pitt:
In 215, Carthage sent an expedition to try to recapture Sardinia, but the fleet was delayed by storms and Rome reinforced the island with a second legion.
In 213, Carthage landed an army of 25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 12 elephants in Sicily, and a fleet of 55 galleys entered Syracuse.
But no great battle developed; neither army was willing to force a battle, and ultimately the Carthaginian army, camped in low-lying marshy ground, fell victim to virulent disease.
A massive Carthaginian relief and resupply expedition was mounted for Syracuse in late 212, with 750 merchantmen carrying supplies and 150 galleys, but the Carthaginian commander wasn't willing to fight a naval engagement against the Roman blockaders, and ultimately withdrew.
I also agree that Senate has been unfairly demonized as being cowardly by the passing of time. Still, it may have been wrong for them in the long-run to overextend their forces by attempting to reinforce several fronts rather than one or two crucial areas. It might've been best if they'd abandoned Sardinia altogether and focused instead on either securing an overland route of reinforcement to Hannibal through Spain and Gaul, or devote their attention to wresting control of Sicily from Rome and securing a reliable sea route to Italy and safe harbors for the Carthaginian fleet to dock and resupply.Quoted from Pitt:
The Carthaginian Senate has often been characterised as timid in its management of the war, but that's an uncharitable view. Certainly they never mobilised to the extent the Romans did, but they probably couldn't. On the other hand, Roman aggressiveness in the conduct of the war often had Carthaginians reacting rather than developing their own strategy. They did mount major expeditions to Sardinia and Sicily, and ordered Hasdrubal to move to Italy in 215, only for him to be halted by the Scipiones.
I was truly unaware of that. I always thought the Senate left him out to dry after Cannae. You have my thanks for curing my ignorance on this subjectQuoted from Pitt:
Despite Hanno's criticism, the Carthaginian Senate did vote to reinforce Hannibal after Cannae, as well as sending more men to Spain. The problem was that it was hard to get reinforcements to Hannibal: "Without a port, and some degree of control of the waters off Sicily, no sizeable reinforcement could reach Hannibal without following the land route he had taken himself." (Goldsworthy, p. 230)
[This message has been edited by DominicusUltimus (edited 04-16-2013 @ 01:46 PM).]
but the Roman ships would not be equipped with the Corvus device as they were in the 1st Punic War unless I'm greatly mistaken. This would mean that both sides would be relying on the traditional tactics of ramming and maneuver, rather than boarding and capture which would give the Carthaginian fleet a key advantage.Not necessarily; Rome's final victory (and one disaster, Battle of Drepana) at sea in the first war was after the abandonment of the
[This message has been edited by Pitt (edited 04-18-2013 @ 03:29 AM).]
I feel the same way. I've actually started rereading Dodge'sQuoted from Pitt:
I like these discussions, because it makes me re-read texts I may have only skimmed or glanced at years before. It refreshes my memory as to things I've forgotten, and usually leads me to learn something new as well.
I'm very familiar with Livy's habit of aggrandizing certain events and omitting details that could've been inconvenient for him. His accounting of the Battle of Magnesia is particularly inconsistent as both he and Appian state the Seleucid army numbering a massive 70,000 men, yet if one adds together their proposed numbers for each of the Seleucid cavalry & infantry corps the total barely amounts to 50,000. He also brushes over Antiochus' charge on the left wing of the Roman-Pergamene army, probably because it resulted in the routing of an allied legion and part of the Roman legion stationed there since their close proximity to the Phrygios River prevented the Seleucid cavalry from simply riding around them and attacking the Roman camp.Quoted from Pitt:
Livy created a picture of utter disaster, that Rome was hopelessly vulnerable (reinforced by L. Caecilius Metellus supposedly talking about abandoning Italy entirely); then if you keep reading, you find that even by his own statements it was not.
Ah I was not aware of this. My overall knowledge of the First Punic War is shamefully lacking as I've only read of Regulus' operations and those of Hamilcar Barca's in Sicily in any sort of depth.Quoted from Pitt:
Not necessarily; Rome's final victory (and one disaster, Battle of Drepana) at sea in the first war was after the abandonment of the corvus, see e.g. Battle of the Aegates Islands. The growing experience of the Romans and the casualties suffered by the Carthaginians created, at the least, a rough parity in seamanship by the end of the war.
Rome had also maintained its fleet, and it had recent experience fighting the Illyrians, whereas the Carthaginian fleet had to be expanded. It's arguable that the Roman fleet was, taken as a whole, the more skilled in the Second Punic War. We don't know, of course, because there weren't any vast fleet engagements, and the details of most of the smaller skirmishes haven't come down to us.
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