Roman Imperialism

By Archdruid

Since World War I, the term ‘Empire’ has taken on some severe negative connotations. Attacked by the liberal media, ‘imperialism’ has become almost synonymous with ‘colonialism’, and has in the minds of many become a form of government rather than a foreign policy that can be adopted by any government – autocratic, democratic, or communist. While an Empire is obviously inclined towards imperialistic behavior, there are many examples of other governments taking on what can be interpreted as an imperial methodology, and foremost among them is that of Republican Rome. According to some scholars, the Roman Empire was acquired defensively, but this view has come under attack of late and it is the purpose of this essay to demonstrate that while the Senate as a body was averse to fighting wars of conquest, the individual aristocrats were not. First, this essay will examine early Roman imperialism in terms of the wars with King Pyrrhus of Epirus and the Carthaginians, at which time the wars of Rome were primarily economic in nature with undertones of personal glory, after which the Jugurthine War and Mithridatic Wars will be interpreted in terms of individuals working in the name of Rome without the State’s explicit approval, or even for the State’s ultimate benefit. By examining these examples, it will be shown that Roman expansion became gradually more aggressive and politically motivated over time, particularly as the end of the Republic neared. Political and economic motives will be the most closely looked at, with ‘patriotism’ taking something of a back seat since in many cases acquiring more provinces was neither desired by nor in the best interests of the state.

Among the first and foremost enemies Rome faced was King Pyrrhus of Epirus. Pyrrhus came to Italy on the behalf of the Greek colony city of Tarentum, the forces of which he took command and subsequently defeated the Romans twice before being driven off. Proponents of the defensive imperialist theory often regard Pyrrhus’ eventual defeat as the Romans defending themselves from foreign invasion , but according to Plutarch, Pyrrhus came to Italy at the behest of the Tarentines to assist them against the Romans with whom they had been fighting for some time . Since the battles with Pyrrhus were the direct result of a peninsular war between Rome and Tarentum, it can not truthfully be described as a foreign invasion. Pyrrhus was invited by Tarentum, he came not as an invader but as an ally, much the way the Romans would in the case of the Greek cities in their disagreements with Carthage not long after. Pyrrhus had a long and relatively successful military career, and eventually died fighting at Argos in Greece, but his exploits in Macedonia, Sicily and Greece are not relevant to the subject of this essay except to establish just how severe a threat he was to Roman interests. According to Plutarch, the Romans were at one point very nearly ready to treat with Pyrrhus, but eventually refused due to the efforts of one old Senator. Pyrrhus had insisted in his treaty offer that Rome leave Tarentum be, and Rome’s response was that he must leave Italy before they would treat with him . The Roman insistence that they be allowed to continue their war of conquest against Tarentum is difficult to interpret as defensive.

The bulk of Republican Rome’s territory was acquired not in the wars against Pyrrhus, but in the Punic Wars. There were three Punic wars, fought by Rome against Carthage, the major trading power in the western Mediterranean. Carthage was originally a colony of the Phoenicians, a people from the Levant who, prior even to the Greeks, colonized parts of the Mediterranean before being absorbed by a variety of Empires from Mesopotamia . Carthage outlived its mother cities, however, and gradually became a substantial power in its own right. The Romans and Carthaginians first came into conflict over Sicily, which through a system of alliances and treaties Rome was beginning to influence. A number of Greek colonies existed in Sicily, including Syracuse, and they soon requested Roman aid against the Carthaginians despite two separate treaties Rome had signed with Carthage in 508 BC and 348 BC recognizing Carthaginian interests in Sicily . The signing of these treaties would seem to indicate that Rome was not looking for war, merely commercial interests, however their continued interference in the affairs of the Greek cities with which Carthage was hostile would indicate otherwise. Eventually tension erupted into open warfare, and the First Punic War took place in a variety of theatres over the course of 24 years, with the lead Carthaginian general at the time being Hamilcar Barca . Eventually the Romans won by defeating the Carthaginians at sea, but the war established great enmity between the two powers.

After the First Punic War, the armies of Carthage, largely made up of mercenaries hired with the wealth garnered by their trade, revolted; Carthage was no longer in a position to pay them. Rome took this opportunity and annexed Sicily and Sardinia, which became the first provinces. The Roman annexation of Sicily and Sardinia can and should be explained as an economic decision; in doing so the Romans deprived the Carthaginians of much of their trade, making it much harder for Carthage to pay its mercenaries and end the so-called “Truceless War” between the mercenaries and regular troops of Carthage . Weakening a major trade rival and acquiring two productive territories are reasonable goals, but once again the Roman desire for economic superiority flies in the face of any defensive theory. Such an act bears striking similarity to the reaction of Mithridates VI of Pontus when the Social War broke out in Italy, who took the opportunity to establish a pretender on the throne of the nearby kingdom of Bithynia and invaded Cappadocia . The Romans certainly interpreted this act by Mithridates as hostile, and there is no logic in pretending the Roman goals in Sicily and Sardinia were any different. Much like World War I and World War II, due to their continuity the Punic Wars can almost be regarded as a single much longer engagement, with the Second and even the Third being direct results of the previous. The Second Punic War, by far the most well known of the three, showcased the brilliant military skills of Hannibal Barca – the son of the Hamilcar who fought in the First Punic War. Hannibal had, according to Livy, sworn an oath at his father Hamilcar’s request to always hate and seek revenge upon the Romans for the humiliation and treachery they inflicted upon Carthage during and after the First Punic War . In this case the Romans certainly began the war on the defensive, but once again it was instigated by their habit of establishing alliances and treaties as a method of dominating areas without actually governing them. Hannibal himself initiated the war by attacking the Roman ally of Saguntum in Spain, which fell after an eight month siege. Rome dispatched an army to Spain; meanwhile Hannibal had begun his famous march from Spain across the mountains into Italy itself . The further details of the Second Punic War are not relevant to this topic, sufficed to say that Rome subdued the Carthaginian holdings in Spain and then defeated Carthage by attacking Africa.

Rome established two provinces in Spain, though the hills and farther areas were not subdued until much later. This was once again almost certainly an economic decision. The Spanish possessions of Carthage had not only allowed it to recover after the First Punic War and the Truceless War, they had effectively funded the complete rebuilding of the Carthaginian army and navy to the point where, merely a generation after the First Punic War ended, Carthage posed an even more serious threat to Roman authority. Spanish resistance was fierce, and Spain could not truly be called subdued until Numantia was destroyed by Scipio Aemelianus. After this, with the exception of Sertorius’ activities there, a government position in Spain was an easy way for a Roman politician to make a substantial amount of money in a short time. Taking this into consideration, it is not hard to see why the Romans would establish provinces in Spain – an economic powerhouse which had proven dangerous in the hands of anybody else. The final subjugation of Spain, however, may have resulted from the desire of Scipio Aemelianus to live up to his family names. His father, Aemilius Paullus, was the conqueror of Macedonia – an act which had brought vast funds into the Roman treasury . By adoption he also shared a relationship with Scipio Africanus , the victor of the Second Punic War, and thus can be seen the early prominence of personal desire in the Roman political system. Important results of the Second Punic War also include the establishment of Numidia, formerly friendly to Carthage, as a Roman ally in North Africa. The Third Punic War was little more than a three-year farce, instigated by Numidian ambitions which led Carthage to defend itself. The Romans intervened for their ally and destroyed Carthage in a lengthy siege under the command of Scipio Aemelianus, after which Rome established the province of North Africa. This, too, was an economic gain; if the repeated successful recovery of Punic Carthage is not evidence enough, there is evidence that as the capital of Roman North Africa Carthage once again became an economic pillar in the western Mediterranean . Rome’s treatment of Macedonia also deserves attention – initially Rome merely imposed taxes, which is clearly an economic benefit, but eventually after repeated challenges by the Kings of Macedon Rome created a new province by that name. The Roman desire for glory does not truly seem to apply in this case, since Plutarch indicates that the command was given to the elderly and unselfish Aemelius Paullus, who kept little of the plunder for himself and was initially reluctant to take the command itself . Regardless of the motives for Roman imperialism prior to the Second Punic War, afterwards the Roman state was in a much stronger economic position and a kind of personal touch became much more common in Roman military matters – personal glory and success became paramount, and this can be most clearly seen by examining the Jugurthine and Mithridatic wars.

The Numidians, whom Rome had turned into allies near the end of the Second Punic War, were not very good allies. A relatively new Kingdom, the Numidians soon gave Rome an excuse to resume hostilities against Carthage in the Third Punic War, and not long after this had been resolved in 146 BC, the death of the Numidian King Micipsa led to a dynastic struggle between two of his sons and a third, adopted heir. The Numidian Kingdom was divided into three, and Jugurtha, the adopted son who had fought beside Scipio Aemelianus in Spain, allegedly had his brother Hiempsal killed. Adherbal, the remaining brother of Jugurtha, appealed to Rome, who at first merely sent a commission to redistribute the Numidian lands. Once the commission had left, Jugurtha began attacking his brother’s lands, eventually besieging him in the city of Cirta. Hostilities and political intrigue continued until Rome sent an army under Quintus Caecilius Metellus to deal with Jugurtha once and for all . Metellus fought the war in a systematic method and was gradually defeating Jugurtha when he was supplanted by a younger commander who claimed Metellus had been dragging on the war unreasonably for his own glory: Gaius Marius. Marius’ ascension to consulship marked a drastic change in the Roman Republic, and his brilliant victories and brutal ambition would have dire consequences. Marius reorganized the Roman army, turning it into the disciplined force which would conquer so much over the next few centuries, and then proceeded to crush all who opposed him. His victories were not without difficulties, however – it was Lucius Cornelius Sulla who finally captured Jugurtha, although Marius was the one who pushed the war to this conclusion . Such blatant competition between a commander and his subordinate was one of the new characteristics of Roman politics, and in many ways this competition would come to dominate all aspects of the Roman military. The same subordinate of Marius, Sulla, would serve with distinction in the Social War, and was then given command against Mithridates VI Eupator, who had arisen as a threat to Roman interests in Asia Minor. These interests consisted of several territories which had been bequeathed to Rome by their leaders, and as usual Rome’s influenced extended much farther than the actual territory governed. When a political ally of Marius attempted to subvert Sulla’s command in Marius’ favor, Sulla marched on Rome. Such a drastic act must be taken as an indication of just how ambitious these men were: Rather than deal with Mithridates, an enemy of the state, Sulla marched on Rome itself to ensure his command would not be transferred to someone equally, if not more capable than himself. At this point it is clear that personal interests were far more important than Rome itself, and such a situation remains until the very end of the Republic. Sulla established his authority and then went on to defeat Mithridates, meanwhile Marius and his allies had retaken Rome. Marius died shortly into his seventh consulship, leaving only his allies Cinna and Carbo in charge. Cinna determined to meet Sulla in Greece and was subsequently killed by mutineers, while Carbo remained in Rome as the sole authority. Civil war itself is shocking; however in this case the civil war was fought essentially over the egos of several men while Mithridates posed a threat to Rome’s eastern territories. More examples of competition between Romans to the detriment of Rome can be found in some of the events of the Mithridatic wars themselves. As mentioned earlier on, Mithridates attempted during the Social War to attack Bithynia and Cappadocia . Upon the command of Rome he withdrew, but Manius Aquillius, a Roman commissioner head in Asia, encouraged the Bithynians to raid Pontus for plunder and Mithridates eventually reacted, thereby beginning the First Mithridatic War . This quest for personal wealth resulted in Aquillius’ death, and Mithridates not only took the Roman province of Asia but attacked Greece as well. This was when Sulla was finally able to deal with him, and inflicted several crushing defeats on Mithridates’ forces even as Marius and his allies took control of Rome. Another Roman army was sent East under Flaccus, who was killed by his subordinate Fimbria, and this army too inflicted a defeat on Mithridates. The seriousness of the situation can be seen by the circumstances of this, however – Sulla’s fleet was nearby under the command of Lucullus, and rather than capture Mithridates and end the threat to Rome, Lucullus allowed Mithridates to escape solely so that the glory for his defeat would not go to Fimbria . The First Mithridatic War ended with Sulla imposing tribute and other conditions upon Mithridates before returning to Rome to deal with Carbo and one of Marius’ relatives. The Second Mithridatic War can barely be called such – it began with another Roman, Murena, seeking glory and attacking Mithridates as he was withdrawing from Cappadocia under the terms of his treaty with Sulla. A firm order from Sulla put a stop to the fighting in this case, and that was the end of the Second Mithridatic War. In 75 BC the King of Bithynia died, and in response to Rome’s annexation of the region Mithridates invaded with his rebuilt armies . Command against him was this time given to Lucullus, the same who had earlier allowed Mithridates to escape capture in order to prevent a fellow Roman from getting the credit. Lucullus, much like Metellus in the Jugurthine War, proceeded slowly and methodically. In another parallel to Metellus, Lucullus eventually lost his command to a young rising star, this time Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus who put an end to the war quickly and then proceeded to settle the east . Pompey had assisted Sulla in his second march on Rome and in establishing his authority after that, and in the meantime had proven himself an effective and ambitious commander. In settling the east, Pompey established a number of allied states and extended Rome’s imperium to include far more territory than it had before, which put an extreme strain on the state itself to live up to Pompey’s agreements. This competition between Roman commanders and politicians for glory and influence was clearly affecting the state in any number of negative ways, and in the not so distant future would result in the Romans gaining Egypt, Gaul, the rest of North Africa, and much more of the Middle East as provinces rather than merely independent states subject to Roman authority.

The ambition of Roman politicians was becoming more severe, and the state itself was gradually buckling under the strain. Eventually, Gaius Julius Caesar would stand victorious over his opponents, only to be assassinated by those fearing his powers. This chain of events would lead to the Republic officially becoming an Empire, all due to the intense competitive spirit and ambition of relatively few men. The Roman Republic acquired an Empire initially for economic reasons, which were gradually replaced by the desire of Roman aristocrats for military glory even at the expense of the state. A distinct turning point can be seen in Marius’ ousting of Metellus in Africa, the beginning of a series of events which would lead to the destruction of the very Republic all these men claimed to be representing.

Bibliography

Cottrell, Leonard, Hannibal Enemy of Rome (New York: 1961)

Heather, Peter, The Fall of the Roman Empire (London, 2005)

Matyszak, Philip, The Enemies of Rome (London, 2004)

Plutarch. Life of Aemilius Paullus. Trans. Robin Waterfield. New York: Oxford, 1999.

Plutarch. Life of Pyrrhus. Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert. London: Penguin, 1973

Scullard, H.H., “Carthage”, Greece & Rome 2 (1955), 98-107

Sherwin-White, A.N., “Rome the Aggressor?”, Journal of Roman Studies 70 (1980), 177- 181